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1 Introduction
Strategy-proofness plays a central role in mechanism design. A social choice function is
strategy-proof if, for every preference prole, truthtelling is a dominant strategy in its in-
duced game form. Hence, the potentially complex strategic decision problems of agents
involved in a strategy-proof social choice function are extremely simple indeed, for whether
or not an agents strategy is dominant depends only on the preferences of the agent and
not on the other agentspreferences. Under strategy-proofness the interlinked decisions
become a collection of independent optimization problems. Thus, the use of a strategy-
proof social choice function does not require (as any other solution concept related to Nash
equilibrium would) any informational hypothesis about the beliefs that each agent holds
about the other agentspreferences, and the subsequent iteration of beliefs until the pref-
erence prole becomes common knowledge. However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
states that requiring truthful reporting of preferences in weakly dominant strategies im-
plies dictatorship whenever preferences of agents are unrestricted. This fundamental result
has directed subsequent research on social choice in the presence of private information
towards suitably restricted domains of preferences which permit the design of anonymous,
and hence non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice functions. Particularly prominent in
this regard is the class of single-peaked preferences and its variants and the strategy-proof
social choice functions characterized for such domains are extensions of the median voter
scheme.2 Single-peaked preferences are well known to have desirable properties in the con-
text of aggregation theory. They also provide the underpinnings of many models in political
and public economics.3
Single-peaked preferences have been specied by postulating an underlying structure on
the set of alternatives that allows one to state for every triple x; y and z of alternatives, that
y is between x and z; and so on, and the restriction imposed by single-peakedness is that if
x is top-ranked for a particular preference ordering, then y; by virtue of being in between
x and z; be ranked at least as high as z: This paper formulates a more general concept of
single-peakedness in terms of a partial order on the set of alternatives with the property
that every pair of alternatives possesses a supremum under the postulated partial order.4
Our concept of single-peakedness requires that for any triple x; y and z of alternatives, a
2Single-peakedness was initially proposed by Black (1948) and Inada (1964). The surveys of Barberà
(2001, 2010) and Sprumont (1995) contain several axiomatic characterizations of the median voter scheme
and its extensions.
3See Austen-Smith and Banks (1999, 2005).
4A partial order is a reexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation.
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preference ordering that has x as its top-ranked alternative should rank the supremum of
the pair (x; y) at least as high as the supremum of the pair (z; y).5
Our main nding is that this concept of single-peakedness is implied by the existence of a
strategy-proof and anonymous social choice function which is determined completely by the
prole of the agents top-ranked alternatives (i.e., is tops-only), and satises additionally the
innocuous requirement of unanimity, whenever such a social choice function can be dened
for an even number of agents and the underlying domain satises a richness requirement.6
Our approach reconstructs the partial order on alternatives in a natural way from the social
choice function with the four stated properties. Observe that the partial order depends on
the particular social choice function under consideration and hence, the derived concept
of single-peakedness may di¤er across di¤erent social choice functions. Our methodology
applies to domains that allow the design of well-behaved social choice functions for any even
number of voters. While this restriction to an even number of voters is somewhat awkward,
we do not necessarily view it as a drawback of our approach, given that our intention is to
reconstruct features of a domain of preferences that allows the design of well-behaved social
choice functions for all societies; indeed while our methodology would not identify a domain
that allows well-behaved social choice functions to be designed only for societies with an
odd number of agents, one might argue that such a domain would be too specic. The
semilattice single-peaked condition identied by our methodology su¢ ces for the design of
well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions for all, in particular odd, numbers of
agents.
Fix a tops-only and unanimous social choice function. Assume the number of agents
is two and let x and y be two alternatives. We say that x  y if and only if x is chosen
at any prole of preferences where one agent has x as the top-ranked alternative and the
other y. The assumed axioms of unanimity and anonymity imply that  is reexive and
antisymmetric respectively. Our requirement that the domain of preferences be rich ensures
that  is transitive and that the social choice function must be of a particular form: at
any prole of preferences, the social choice is the supremum of the pair of alternatives that
are top-ranked by the two agents. Our denition of single-peakedness now obtains as a
direct consequence of strategy-proofness. This methodology applies whenever the number
of agents is even. A similar nding holds under an additional axiom of invariance when
a social choice function with the aforementioned properties can be dened only for an
5Later in the paper we explain this property and discuss why it may be seen as a weakening of single-
peakedness.
6Most well-known social choice functions identied in the restricted domain literature generate binary
relations that allow interesting preference domains to satisfy our richness requirement.
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odd number of agents. As a converse to our main nding, we show that any domain of
preferences (there is no richness requirement) which is semilattice single-peaked with respect
to a partial order possessing the supremum property admits a strategy-proof, anonymous,
and unanimous social choice function that is completely determined by the prole of the
agents top-ranked alternatives, for any number of agents.
In the literature on social choice on restricted domains, there has been interest in for-
mulating a sort of converse to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; a statement that would
identify features of a domain that are implied by the design of a unanimous, strategy-proof
social choice function that is non-dictatorial. It has been conjectured that domain restric-
tions of the single-peaked variety and social choice functions of the median voter scheme
form are salient in this regard.7 We formalize a non-dictatorial social choice function using
the axiom of anonymity and require additionally that the social choice function satisfy the
tops-only property. For the complete domain, strategy-proofness and unanimity imply the
tops-only property. Given that we work in a restricted domain setting with no structure
on the set of alternatives, it does not appear feasible to derive the tops-only property as
a consequence of strategy-proofness and unanimity; we accordingly impose it as an axiom.
Our methods lead to a simple and fairly general version of a statement to the e¤ect that
a particular form of single-peakedness is implied by strategy-proofness in conjunction with
anonymity and other natural axioms and that this form of single-peakedness su¢ ces for
the design of social choice functions with these properties. In particular, the semilattice
structure on alternatives arises endogenously as it is implied by the axioms on the social
choice function and a richness condition relative to the social choice function, and does
not rely on any a priori structure on the set of alternatives or preferences (apart from the
requirement that each preference has a unique top-ranked alternative).
1.1 Related literature
An early formulation of a partial converse statement to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theo-
rem is Bogomolnaia (1998). In a model with nitely many alternatives and two agents,
she identies the features of any anonymous and tops-only social choice function under
which the nite set of alternatives can be embedded into a nite dimensional Euclidean
space with a grid structure with the property that the social choice function takes the form
of a (multi-dimensional) median voter scheme. This embedding depends crucially on the
set of alternatives being nite. These features of tops-only and anonymous social choice
7Conjectures of this nature have been attributed by Barberà (2010) to Faruk Gul and referred to as
Guls conjecture.
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functions are stated in terms of the same binary relation induced by a two agent tops-only
and anonymous social choice function that we use in our paper, and are the following:
(i) the binary relation is transitive and a semilattice and (ii) the social choice function is
the supremum of the pair of alternatives that are the top-ranked alternatives of the two
agents. These ndings are extended to the three agent case under similar, but somewhat
more demanding, hypotheses and she derives additionally that the domain of preferences
must be multi-dimensional single-peaked on the set of alternatives. Our work extends this
methodology in the following sense. We postulate a richness condition on the domain in
terms of the binary relation on alternatives induced by a two agent social choice function
satisfying our axioms and derive that the binary relation is transitive and that the social
choice function has the supremum property. This is used to establish the salience of the
supremum rule and a version of single-peaked preferences in a general setting with an arbi-
trary number of agents without requiring the set of alternatives to be nite. In particular,
under our richness condition, the set of alternatives need not turn out to be embedded
in a nite dimensional Euclidean space with a grid structure as in Bogomolnaia (1998),
but the identication of the social choice function as a supremum rule on our version of a
single-peaked domain remains valid.8
More recently, work by Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b and 2010), and Chatterji,
Sanver and Sen (2013), provide formulations of such a converse statement. Our paper
complements these approaches and is closely related to the approach of these papers in
that our axioms on the social choice function are similar. However, there are important
di¤erences in the scope of our model and our methodology. The richness condition in
these papers is specied independently of the social choice function whose existence is
postulated whereas in our paper the richness condition is specied in relation to the social
choice function. But more importantly, the methodology in these papers strongly relies
also on the niteness of the set of alternatives and on strict preferences. The approach
of Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b and 2010) assumes a specic structure on the nite
set of alternatives by means of a given property space from which a betweenness relation
can be derived. Again, their approach assumes that the set of alternatives is nite and
it is endowed with an a priori structure, the property space. The richness condition in
Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) is specied in terms of alternatives that appear as the
rst and second ranked alternatives in di¤erent preference orderings which makes it specic
8Observe that neither Bogomolnaia (1998) nor we pretend to characterize a subclass of strategy-proof
social choice functions on a given restricted domain of preferences. Rather, the objective is to identify the
key property of any domain that admits a well-behaved and strategy-proof social choice function.
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to a model with nitely many alternatives with strict preferences and also excludes the
consideration of preferences commonly employed in the study of multidimensional models.
Our formulation is more permissive in that we impose no niteness requirement on the set
of alternatives and, provided the top-ranked alternative is unique, we admit indi¤erences.
As a consequence, our methodology is of necessity di¤erent and somewhat more direct than
that of those papers. Many prominent restricted domains of preferences studied in the
literature appear as special cases of our formulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic denitions and notation
while Section 3 contains the main results for the case of an even number of agents. In
Section 4 we relate our results to the large literature on domain restrictions for non-trivial
strategy-proof social choice functions. Section 5 elaborates on our methodology and axioms
and gathers some nal remarks. An appendix contains an analysis of the case of an odd
number of agents, the proofs of two results omitted in the main text, and the case of a
nite set of alternatives.
2 Basic denitions and notation
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the nite set of agents, with n  2, and A be any set of alternatives.
We do not assume any a priori structure on the set of alternatives. Each agent i 2 N
has a preference (relation) Ri 2 D over A, where D is a subset of complete, reexive and
transitive binary relations on A:9 The set D is referred to as the domain of preferences.
For any x; y 2 A; xRiy means that agent i considers alternative x to be at least as good as
alternative y: Let Pi and Ii denote the strict and indi¤erence relations induced by Ri over
A, respectively; namely, for any x; y 2 A; xPiy if and only if xRiy and :yRix; and xIiy if
and only if xRiy and yRix. We assume that for each Ri 2 D there exists t(Ri) 2 A, the top
of Ri, such that t(Ri)Piy for all y 2 Anft(Ri)g: For x 2 A, let Rxi denote any preference in
D with t(Rxi ) = x:Moreover, we assume that for each x 2 A the domain D contains at least
one preference Rxi : A prole R = (R1; : : : ; Rn) 2 Dn is an n tuple of preferences, one for
each agent. To emphasize the role of agent i we will often write the prole R as (Ri; R i).
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f : Dn ! A that assigns to every prole
R 2 Dn an alternative f(R) 2 A:
An SCF f : Dn ! A is tops-only if for all R;R0 2 Dn such that t(Ri) = t(R0i) for all
i 2 N , f(R) = f(R0). Hence, a tops-only SCF f : Dn ! A can be written as f : An ! A:
9A binary relation  over A is complete if for all x; y 2 A either x  y or y  x, it is reexive if for all
x 2 A; x  x, and it is transitive if for all x; y; z 2 A; [x  y and y  z]) [x  z]:
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Accordingly, we will on occasion use the notation f(t(R1); : : : ; t(Rn)) interchangeably with
f(R1; : : : ; Rn):
An SCF f : Dn ! A is unanimous if for all R 2 Dn and x 2 A such that t(Ri) = x for
all i 2 N , f(R) = x:
To dene an anonymous SCF on Dn; for every prole R 2 Dn and every one-to-one
mapping  : N ! N , dene the prole R = (R(1); : : : ; R(n)) as the  permutation of
R, where for all i 2 N , R(i) is the preference that agent (i) had in the prole R. Observe
that the domain Dn is closed under permutations, since it is the Cartesian product of the
same set D. An SCF f : Dn ! A is anonymous if for all one-to-one mappings  : N ! N
and all R 2 Dn, f(R) = f(R):
An SCF f : Dn ! A is strategy-proof if for all i 2 N , all R 2 Dn and all R0i 2 D;
f(R)Rif(R
0
i; R i):
An SCF f is strategy-proof if for every agent at every preference prole R truth-telling is
a weakly dominant strategy in the direct revelation game induced by f at R:
In this paper, in addition to strategy-proofness, we will require the SCF to satisfy
anonymity. This is a key assumption in our analysis and is in some ways an opposite
of dictatorship as the identity of no particular agent matters in determining the social
outcome. The appeal of this axiom is obvious. In addition we will impose that the SCF
also satisfy the tops-only requirement. This axiom simplies considerably the specication
of the SCF, as well as the act of reporting preferences and checking that there are no gainful
manipulations, and is pervasive in the literature on the characterization of strategy-proof
SCFs on restricted domains. This axiom has some normative appeal and it is of interest to
study what sort of preference domains permit the design of a strategy-proof SCF that is also
tops-only. We discuss the role of this axiom further in Section 5. The axiom of unanimity is
natural to impose and is mild as it follows as a consequence of strategy-proofness whenever
the SCF is required to be onto the set of alternatives.
3 Results
3.1 Obtaining the induced binary relation
In this subsection we assume that n = 2 and indicate how to obtain a binary relation 
from a tops-only SCF f : D2 ! A and show that if the SCF satises in addition unanimity
and anonymity, then  is reexive and antisymmetric.10 In doing so, we follow a procedure
10A binary relation  over A is antisymmetric if for all x; y 2 A; [x  y and y  x]) [x = y]:
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introduced by Bogomolnaia (1998).
Let f : D2 ! A be a tops-only SCF. Dene the binary relation  induced by f over A
as follows: for all x; y 2 A,
x  y if and only if f(x; y) = x: (1)
An SCF aggregates individual preferences and can be seen as a systematic procedure
specifying how a society resolves its membersdisagreements. Hence, the binary relation 
induced by an SCF f over A may be interpreted as the outcome of this procedure applied to
the family of basic situations in which there are only two agents; the relation x  y reects
the fact that in this scenario the alternative x prevails over y:11 We will show later that if
the SCF f is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous, then its induced binary relation 
is transitive, provided the domain of f satises a richness condition. Here we note that the
following result is immediate.
Remark 1 Let f : D2 ! A be a tops-only SCF and  be the binary relation induced by f
over A. If f is unanimous, then  is reexive. If f is anonymous, then  is antisymmetric.
Although this construction of the binary relation  induced by f : D2 ! A over A
might seem very specic to the two agent case, we can extend this methodology to the case
where n is any positive even integer as follows.
Given a strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous SCF g : Dn ! A where n is a positive
even integer, we start by stating the following fact which appears as Proposition 2 in
Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013).
Fact 1 Let D be an arbitrary domain and let n be a positive even integer. Suppose there
exists a strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous SCF g : Dn ! A. Let N1 = f1; : : : ; n2g
and N2 = fn2 + 1; : : : ; ng: Then SCF f : D2 ! A, dened by setting, for all (R1; R2) 2 D2;
f(R1; R2) = g( R) where R 2 Dn is such that Rj = R1 for all j 2 N1 and Rj = R2 for all
j 2 N2, is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous. Moreover, if g is unanimous, then so
is f:
In view of Fact 1, we say that a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous
SCF g : Dn ! A; where n is a positive even integer, induces a binary relation  over A,
where it is understood that  is the binary relation induced by f over A where f is induced
from g by cloningthe rst n
2
agents as agent 1 and the remaining as agent 2.
11Since the binary relation is not required to be complete, it may be the case that neither alternative
prevails over the other and f(x; y) is a third alternative z:
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3.2 An illustration of the main result
We use the prominent instance of a median voter rule dened on a domain of single-peaked
preferences (originally proposed by Black (1948) and studied by Moulin (1980)), to illustrate
our main nding and summarize what the paper tries to accomplish. Following Moulin
(1980), assume that the set of alternatives is the unit interval in the real line endowed with
the linear order >; i.e., A = [0; 1]. A preference Ri is single-peaked on A if there exists a
unique alternative t(Ri) 2 A such that, for all x 2 Anft(Ri)g, t(Ri)Pix and for all x; y 2 A;
xRiy whenever either t(Ri)  x > y or y > x  t(Ri): Let SP be the set of all single-peaked
preferences on A: An SCF f : SP2 ! A is a median voter rule if there exists a xed ballot
 2 A such that for all (R1; R2) 2 SP2;12
f(R1; R2) = med>(t(R1); t(R2); ):
A characterization result in Moulin (1980) implies that any strategy-proof, tops-only, anony-
mous and unanimous SCF f : SP2 ! A is a median voter rule.
So assume the SCF f : SP2 ! A is a median voter rule and let  be its associated
xed ballot. Since a median voter rule depends only on the top ranked alternatives of the
agentspreferences, it will be convenient to write f(R1; R2) as f(x; y) where x = t(R1),
and y = t(R2). We now apply condition (1) to f to generate a binary relation on A
by saying that for all x; y 2 A, x  y if and only if f(x; y) = x: Since f(x; x) = x (the
median voter rule is unanimous),  is reexive and since f(x; y) = f(y; x) for all x; y, 
is also antisymmetric. It is however not complete since if x and y lie on opposite sides
of , f(x; y) =  and so x  y and y  x. Furthermore, the domain of single-peaked
preferences satises our richness condition (this is formally dened in Subsection 3.3), and
this will imply that  is transitive. As a consequence,  is a partial order and (we will
prove that in general) for every pair x; y 2 A; sup(x; y) exists and is given by f(x; y),
so that  is a semilattice. Hence f(x; y) = med>(x; y; ) = sup(x; y): Figure 1 gives
a geometric representation of this semilattice, where the arrows indicate the direction of
the partial order  on the interval [0; 1], so y  x whenever x and y are such that either
0  x < y   or   y < x  1:
r r
0 1
r--  
Figure 1
12Given a list of K real numbers (x1; : : : ; xK), where K is a positive odd integer, dene
med>(x1; : : : ; xK) = y, where y 2 R is such that #ft 2 f1; : : : ;Kg j xt  yg = #ft 2 f1; : : : ;Kg j
xt  yg = K+12 :
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Our main result will show that for the strategy-proofness of the median voter rule
f , one does not actually need the domain of preferences to be single-peaked; it may be
larger. To see this, suppose agent two has the top ranked alternative y and agent ones
true preference puts x on top. Strategy-proofness requires that f(x; y)Rxi f(z; y) for all
z 2 A, which is equivalent to the requirement that sup(x; y)Rxi sup(z; y). This last
condition is our concept of semilattice single-peakedness. Figure 2 illustrates a semilattice
single-peaked preference Ri on (A;) when supA = . Observe four features of Ri.
First, Ri is far from being single-peaked on A. Second, Ri is monotonically (not necessarily
strictly) decreasing on the segment [t(Ri); ]; and hence single-peaked on it, for should
there exist y; z 2 (t(Ri); ) such that y < z and zPiy; then f(z; y) = zPiy = f(t(Ri); y),
a manipulation. Third, no condition is imposed between pairs on [0; t(Ri)): Fourth, Rix
for each alternative x 2 (; 1] and no condition is imposed between pairs of alternatives
on this segment. The reason underlying the last two conditions is that if t(Ri) < ; then
f(t(Ri); y) 2 [t(Ri); )] and hence how Ri orders pairs of alternatives that are either below
t(Ri) or above  is irrelevant for the manipulability of f:
r rr r
0 1t(Ri) 
Q
Q
Q
QQ





E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E










@




 
 
 
  J
J
J
J
J
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
Z
Z
Z ((( Q
Q
Q
Q
QQ 
Figure 2
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We establish the following general version of the conguration presented above: If a
preference domain admits a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF for
an even number of agents, then the preferences must be semilattice single-peaked. We
also establish that given a semilattice single-peaked domain of preferences, we can dene a
strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF for any number of voters.
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3.3 Rich domains and semilattice single-peaked preferences
We now turn to a description of the domain of preferences that we characterize in this
paper. First we present the concept of a rich domain on a set of alternatives endowed with
a binary relation. Fix a binary relation  over A. Given two alternatives x; y 2 A with
y  x, dene the set [x; y] as
[x; y] = fx; yg [ fz 2 A j y  z and z  xg:
If x and y are distinct alternatives and related by  as y  x, then the set [x; y] is obtained
by adding to the set fx; yg all alternatives in A that lie betweenx and y according to
 : For y  x dene [x; y] = ;.
Definition 1 Let  be a binary relation over A. The domain D is rich on (A;) if for
all x; y 2 A with [x; y] 6= ; and z =2 [x; y], there exist Rxi ; Ryi 2 D such that yP xi z and xP yi z:
Richness says that for any pair of distinct alternatives x and y related by  and any
alternative z not lying between x and y; a rich domain has to contain two preference
relations with the properties that for one of the preferences x is the top-ranked alternative
and y is strictly preferred to z; and for the other preference y is the top-ranked alternative
and x is strictly preferred to z. Our concept of a rich domain is relative to the binary
relation induced by the SCF that is applied to it. Thus, whether or not a domain D is rich
depends on the particular SCF f : D2 ! A operating on it. Below we will illustrate the
concept of rich domain by means of an example.
We now exhibit conditions under which  is transitive.
Lemma 1 Let (D; A;) be such that D is rich on (A;): If there exists an SCF f : D2 ! A
that induces  over A and is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous, then  is transitive.
Proof : Assume the three distinct alternatives x; y; z 2 A are such that x  y and y  z.
We show that x  z; namely, f(x; z) = x. First, suppose f(x; z) = w =2 fx; yg: By strategy-
proofness, f(x;w) = w: Hence, w  x  y and w =2 [y; x] 6= ;: Since D is rich on (A;),
there exists Rx1 2 D such that yP x1 w: But then,
f(y; z) = yP x1 w = f(x; z);
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f: Thus, f(x; z) 2 fx; yg: Assume f(x; z) = y:
But then, by strategy-proofness, f(x; y) = y; a contradiction with x  y: Hence f(x; z) = x
and x  z. Thus,  is transitive. 
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A partial order  over A is a reexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation
over A: A partial order  over A is a (join-)semilattice if for all (x; y) 2 AA; sup(x; y)
exists.13 In Lemma 2 below we will establish that the binary relation  induced by f on A is
a (join-)semilattice, provided that f is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous
and D is rich on (A;): We now turn to our concept of a single-peaked preference in this
setting.
Definition 2 Let  be a semilattice over A. The preference Rxi 2 D is semilattice single-
peaked on (A;) if for all y; z 2 A, sup(x; y)Rxi sup(z; y).
We say that a domain D is semilattice single-peaked on (A;) if it is a subset of all
semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A;).
Single-peaked preferences embodies the idea that an alternative y that is closer to
the top x of a preference ordering Rxi than is an alternative z, should be ranked at least
as high as z: We now argue that semilattice single-peakedness embodies in some measure
this idea in its treatment of those pairs of alternatives that arise as suprema under the
semilattice  : Given a triple of alternatives x; y; z, we say that y is closerto x than is
z according to the semilattice ; if x  y holds and x  z  y (equivalently, z 2 [x; y])
does not hold: Now consider any preference Rxi 2 D and consider any pair of alternatives
y; z. Assume rst that sup(z; y)  x: Then we have x  sup(x; y)  sup(z; y) holds,
so that sup(x; y) is closer to the top x of R
x
i than is sup(z; y): Even when the condition
sup(z; y)  x does not hold, we have at any rate that sup(z; y) =2 [x; sup(x; y)] and
here too sup(x; y) is closer to the top x of R
x
i than is sup(z; y): Indeed the condition of
semilattice single-peakedness requires that in this situation, sup(x; y) being closer to the
top x; should be ranked by Rxi at least as high as sup(z; y).
To better understand the concepts of richness and semilattice single-peakedness on
(A;), it is convenient to look at the semilattice (A;) as a partially directed graph.
To make the argument more transparent assume A is nite and that supA exists and is
denoted by : Figure 3 represents an example of such a semilattice (A;) as a partially
directed graph, where A = fx; y; z; ; x1; : : : ; x13g and the direction of an arrow on the edge
linking two alternatives indicates how they are related according to the partial order ; for
example, x  ! y means that y  x (arrows that can be obtained from the transitivity of
 are omitted).
13Given x; y 2 A; sup(x; y) = z if and only if z is the least element in A that is greater than or equal
(according to ) to x and y; namely z 2 fw 2 A j w  x and w  yg and, for all z0 2 fw 2 A j w  x and
w  yg; z0  z: Since  is antisymmetric, if the supremum exists it is unique.
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First consider the pair of alternatives ; x: Since   x; the set [x; ] is non-empty and
equals fx; y; z; x2; x3; x4; g. Richness would require that there exist for the set [x; ], two
preferencesRxi ; R

i 2 D such that P xi v and xP i v only for alternatives v 2 fx1; x5; x6; x7; x8;
x9; x10; x11; x12; x13g:
We next illustrate the restrictions implied by semilattice single-peakedness on a prefer-
ence ordering where the alternative x is top-ranked. The denition of semilattice single-
peakedness imposes two sorts of restrictions on a preference relation Rxi (in addition to xP
x
i y
for all y 6= x). The rst of these applies to alternatives that appear along any   path
emanating from x. There are two such paths from x to  (emphasized with bold type
links); namely, x  y  x3  z   and x  x2  x4  z  : Along such paths, we have
classical single-peakedness. Thus, since the pair y; z belong to the rst path, we have yRxi z.
Observe that sup(x; y) = y and sup(z; y) = z: However, note that since the alternatives
x3 and x4 belong to di¤erent paths, there is no restriction on the relative ranking of these
two alternatives in Rxi ; indeed if one were to apply Denition 2 with x3; x4 playing the role
of y; z respectively, one only obtains sup(x; x3) = x3R
x
i z = sup(x4; x3):
The second restriction applies to alternatives that are not in a   path from x to :
Such alternatives are dispreferred to the closest alternative in the path; namely, if w
and r are such that x  w  , r =2 [x; ]; and sup(x; r) = w, then wRxi r (observe that
sup(r; r) = r). For instance in Figure 3, yR
x
i x5 and yR
x
i x1 but no condition is imposed
on the preference between x5 and x1; moreover, take any z0; z00 2 fx10; x11; x12g such that
z0 6= z00 and observe that sup(x; z0) = z, sup(z00; z0) = x12 and sup(z0; z0) = z0: Then,
zRxi x12 and zR
x
i z
0.
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Finally, we enumerate below the restrictions implied on a preference Rxi over A: By de-
nition, we know that xP xi y
0 for all y0 =2 Anfxg. Semilattice single-peakedness imposes the
following relations among pairs of alternatives (observe that in Figure 3, z is the supremum
of Anf; x13g):14
 yRxi x3Rxi z since sup(x; y) = yRxi x3 = sup(x3; y) and sup(x; x3) = x3Rxi z =
sup(z; x3):
 x2Rxi x4Rxi z since sup(x; x2) = x2Rxi x4 = sup(x4; x2) and sup(x; x4) = x4Rxi z =
sup(z; x4):
 yRxi xk for k = 1; 5 since sup(x; xk) = yRxi xk = sup(xk; xk) (i.e., xk plays simulta-
neously the role of y and z in Denition 2).
 x2Rxi x6 since sup(x; x6) = x2Rxi x6 = sup(x6; x6) (i.e., x6 plays simultaneously the
role of y and z in Denition 2).
 zRxi xk for k = 10; 11; 12 since sup(x; xk) = zRxi xk = sup(xk; xk):
 Rxi x13 since sup(x; x13) = Rxi x13 = sup(x13; x13) (i.e., x13 plays simultaneously
the role of y and z in Denition 2).
Observe that semilattice single-peakedness leaves freedom to Rxi on how it orders many
pairs of alternatives. For instance, we have already noted that the relative ranking of the
pair x3; x4 is not xed. Consider next the path x7  ! x9  ! x: Here too, letting x7; x9
play the role of y; z in Denition 2 does not lead to any restriction on the relative rankings
of x7 and x9 in Rxi since sup(x; x9) = xR
x
i x9 = sup(x7; x9):
Proposition 1 below shows that the two restrictions used in the example characterize
indeed semilattice single-peakedness. After stating the main result of the paper in Propo-
sition 3 we will be in a better position to comment on why semilattice single-peakedness
emerges as an implication of strategy-proofness (and other desirable properties) and can be
seen as a weakening of the classical concept of single-peakedness.
Proposition 1 Let  be a semilattice over A: Then, the preference Rxi is semilattice
single-peaked on (A;) if and only if the following two properties hold:
(i) for all y; z 2 A such that x  y  z, yRxi z;
(ii) for all w 2 A such that x  w; sup(x;w)Rxiw:
14In addition to the relations derived from the transitivity of Rxi , these are the only relations imposed
on Rxi by semilattice single-peakedness.
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Proof: Assume that Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A;) and let y; z 2 A be such
that x  y  z: Then, (i) follows because sup(x; y) = yRxi z = sup(z; y): Let w 2
A be such that x  w: If x  w then (ii) follows because x = sup(x;w) and xP xi w:
If x  w then (ii) follows since w = sup(w;w) and, by semilattice single-peakedness,
sup(x;w)R
x
i sup(w;w) = w:
Assume that (i) and (ii) hold for Rxi and let z; y 2 A be arbitrary. We show that
sup(x; y)R
x
i sup(z; y) (2)
holds by distinguishing among three cases.
Case 1: sup(x; y) = x: Then (2) holds trivially since x = t(R
x
i ):
Case 2: sup(x; y) = y 6= x: The case sup(z; y) = y is trivial. If sup(z; y) = w 6= y then
x  y  w and, by (i), y = sup(x; y)Rxi sup(z; y): Thus, (2) holds.
Case 3: sup(x; y) = w =2 fx; yg: First, assume that sup(z; y) = y: Since x  y; by
(ii), wRxi y: Hence, sup(x; y) = wR
x
i y = sup(z; y): Thus, (2) holds. Assume now that
s = sup(z; y) 6= y: If s  x then, s is an upper bound of x and y: Hence, x  w  s:
By (i), wRxi s: Hence, sup(x; y) = wR
x
i s = sup(z; y): Thus, (2) holds. Assume nally
that s  x: By (ii), r  sup(x; s)Rxi s: Note that r is an upper bound of x and y: Hence,
x  w  r: By (i), wRxi r: Hence, sup(x; y) = wRxi rRxi s = sup(z; y): Thus, (2) holds. 
3.4 Semilattice single-peaked domains admit an SCF with the
desirable properties
Before presenting the main result of the paper in Proposition 3 below, we show that a
semilattice single-peaked domain admits a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unan-
imous SCF for an arbitrary number of agents. This generalizes in a very simple way the
converse of the main result in Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) to settings where A is not
necessarily nite and the underlying structure is not necessarily a tree.
Proposition 2 Let D be a semilattice single-peaked domain on the semilattice (A;).
Then, there exists a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : Dn ! A
for all n: Moreover, if n is even then  is induced by f over A.
Proof : We rst establish the following induction step: Suppose for k  2; sup(x1; : : : ; xk)
exists for every set fx1; : : : ; xkg of k distinct alternatives. Then for any alternative xk+1 =2
fx1; : : : ; xkg, sup(x1; : : : ; xk+1) exists and is given by sup
 
sup(x1; : : : ; xk); xk+1

.
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To verify this step, let y = sup(x1; : : : ; xk). By the induction hypothesis, sup(y; xk+1)
exists and is denoted w. Since  is transitive, w is an upper bound for (x1; : : : ; xk+1).
Suppose there exists v 2 Anfwg such that v is an upper bound for (x1; : : : ; xk+1). Then it
must be that v  y since y = sup(x1; : : : ; xk). We also have v  xk+1: These imply that
v is an upper bound for (y; xk+1): But since sup(y; xk+1) exists and is w; we must have
v  w and so w = sup(x1; : : : ; xk+1):
Given a preference prole R 2 Dn, let G(R) = fx1; : : : ; xkg; k  n; be the set of distinct
alternatives such that for each r = 1; : : : ; k; xr = t(Ri) for some i 2 N .
For every R 2 Dn; dene
f(R) = supG(R): (3)
Since  is a semilattice, the induction step veried earlier implies that f is well-dened.
By construction, f is tops-only, anonymous and unanimous. We next show that f is
strategy-proof. Given R 2 Dn and i 2 N; let G(R i) = G(R)nft(Ri)g and observe that
f(Ri; R i) = sup(t(Ri); supG(R i)): To show that f is strategy-proof, we wish to show
for arbitrary Rxi 2 D and Rzi 2 D, z 2 Anfxg;
f(Rxi ; R i) = sup(x; supG(R i))R
x
i sup(z; supG(R i)) = f(R
z
i ; R i): (4)
By the denition of f in (3) and the denition of semilattice single-peakedness, (4) holds.
It is straightforward to verify that when n is a even positive integer,  is induced by f
as dened following Fact 1. 
3.5 Results for the case of n even
We now proceed by rst showing that any strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous SCF
f : D2 ! A can be seen as the supremum of the binary relation  induced by f over A,
provided that the domain of f is rich on (A;):15
Lemma 2 Let (D; A;) be such that D is rich on (A;): If there exists an SCF f : D2 ! A
that induces  over A and is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous, then for all x; y 2 A,
f(x; y) = sup(x; y).
Proof : Let x; y 2 A and assume rst that x 6= y. If f(x; y) = x; then x  y: By strategy-
proofness, f(x; x) = x and hence, x  x: Thus, x = sup(x; y): Similarly if f(x; y) = y:
15Subsection 5.2 contains an example of a set A and a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unan-
imous SCF f on a domain that is not rich on (A;) with the property that  is not a semilattice and f
does not take the supremum form.
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Assume f(x; y) = z =2 fx; yg: By strategy-proofness, f(z; y) = f(x; z) = z: Hence, z  x
and z  y: Thus, z is an upper bound of (x; y): Assume z 6= sup(x; y); namely, there exists
z 2 A, z 6= z, such that z  x and z  y and either z  z; or z is not comparable to z:
In either case we have z  z and hence, z =2 [x; z] 6= ;: Furthermore we have f(z; y) = z.
Since D is rich on (A;), there exists Rx1 2 D such that zP x1 z: But then,
f(z; y) = zP x1 z = f(x; y);
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f: Assume now that x = y and f(x; x) = z:
We want to show that sup(x; x) = z: Suppose not; i.e., there exists w 2 A such that
w  x and either z  w or z is not comparable to w: In either case we have w  z and so
z =2 [x;w] 6= ;: Since D is rich on (A;) there exists Rx1 2 D such that wP x1 z: But then,
f(w; x) = wP x1 z = f(x; x);
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f: 
Lemmata 1 and 2 do not require that the SCF should be unanimous. If the SCF f in
Lemmata 1 and 2 is unanimous then the binary relation  induced by f over A is reexive.
Similarly, if the SCF g in Fact 1 is unanimous, then so is f: From now on we will be
interested only in unanimous SCFs.
Recall that (in view of Fact 1) when we say that a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous
and unanimous SCF g : Dn ! A; where n is a positive even integer, induces a binary
relation  over A, it is understood that  is the binary relation induced by f over A where
f is induced from g by cloningthe rst n
2
agents as agent 1 and the remaining as agent
2. We now state our principal nding.
Proposition 3 Let (D; A;) be such that D is rich on (A;): If there exists an SCF
g : Dn ! A; where n is a positive even integer, that induces  over A and is strategy-
proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous, then (i)  is a semilattice over A, (ii) for
all x; y 2 A, f(x; y) = sup(x; y); where f is induced from g; and (iii) D is semilattice
single-peaked on (A;).
Proof : The proofs of (i) and (ii) follow from Lemmata 1 and 2 respectively. To show
that the condition specied in Denition 2 holds, observe that by Lemma 2 and strategy-
proofness, f(x; y) = sup(x; y)R
x
1 sup(z; y) = f(z; y). 
In light of Proposition 3, we are now ready to comment on why semilattice single-
peakedness becomes necessary and constitutes a weakening of single-peakedness. Condition
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(i) in Proposition 1 inherits (only partially) the general concept of single-peakedness: the
preference is decreasing when alternatives are farther from the top, according only to the
increasing direction of the partial order (i.e., x  y  z implies yRxi z). To see why
no condition is imposed on the preference in the decreasing direction of the partial order
(i.e., z  y  x), x x 2 A, Rxi and an SCF f with the desirable properties (and its
induced semilattice  over A). Dene the set of options left open by x at f as the set of
alternatives that may be selected by f for some top alternative of the other agent; namely,
of (x) = fz 2 A j z = f(x; y) for some y 2 Ag: We know from the maximal domain
literature that,16 to guarantee that f be strategy-proof, Rxi has to be single-peaked only on
of (x): But observe that according to (ii) in Proposition 3, of (x) = fz 2 A j z  xg: Hence,
y; z =2 of (x) whenever z  y  x: This explains the form of condition (i) in Proposition
1. Moreover, if x  z then, by (ii) in Proposition 3, strategy-proofness and unanimity,
sup(x; z) = f(x; z)R
x
i f(z; z) = z; which implies that condition (ii) in Proposition 1 holds.
4 Related literature
In this section we relate our results to the large literature on restricted domains. The
starting point of this approach is to assume that the set of alternatives A has a particular
structure (for instance, A is a linearly ordered set). Using this structure one can dene a
meaningful domain restriction on preferences over A (for instance, single-peakedness) under
which non-trivial strategy-proof SCFs can be dened (for instance, the median voter rule).
Our Proposition 2 (and its proof) follows partially this approach. We start by hypothesizing
that the set A; together with the binary relation ; is a semilattice from which we dene
the domain D of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A;): We then show that there
exists a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f on the domain D
which, when n is a positive even integer, is such that  is induced by f over A: We
want to emphasize however that our main contribution is Proposition 3, which follows a
very di¤erent approach. Without assuming any structure on the set of alternatives A, we
suppose that there is a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF g on
a given domain D of preferences over A. Following Bogomolnaia (1998) we show how to
identify using condition (1) a binary relation  over A: Then, provided that the domain
D is rich on (A;); we prove that (A;) is a semilattice, the domain D is semilattice
single-peaked on (A;) and g can be obtained as the supremum rule of a two-agent SCF
16See for instance Barberà, Massó and Neme (1999), Berga and Serizawa (2000), Ching and Serizawa
(1998), Hatsumi, Berga and Serizawa (2014) and Serizawa (1995).
18
f induced from g: Hence, the semilattice structure on A follows from the existence of an
SCF satisfying the desirable properties without imposing any condition on A whatsoever.
We now relate with more detail our results to some representative results of the restricted
domains literature. In particular, we consider well studied SCFs in this literature and
uncover the associated semilattice that is implicit in each formulation.
4.1 Single-peaked preferences on a line
We return to the median voter rule f : D2 ! A (where A = [0; 1]), represented by a xed
ballot  2 A and already presented in Subsection 3.2. Let  be the binary relation induced
by f on A: As we have already seen, the following facts hold.
(a) The median voter rule f is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous on
D.
(b) The binary relation  induced from f using (1) is as follows: if either y < x   or
  x < y then x  y and if x >  > y then x  y and y  x:
(c) The domain of single-peaked preferences SP is rich on (A;) and is a strict subset of
the set of all semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A;), already represented in Figure
2.
(d) For all x; y 2 A; f(x; y) = sup(x; y) = med>fx; y; g:
Moreover, the following fact can be veried.
(e) The domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with the intersection of all semi-
lattice single-peaked preferences, where each of these sets is associated to each of all possible
values  in A. In other words, the set of single-peaked preferences is the largest prefer-
ence domain that is semilattice single-peaked relative to all binary relations induced by all
median voter rules (i.e., all strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCFs).
4.2 Semi-single-peaked preferences
In the previous subsection the set of alternatives was assumed to be linearly ordered and
single-peakedness of preferences and the median was dened with respect to this linear
order. We now turn to a more general formulation where the alternatives are arranged on
a tree. In this case, one may move away from the top of a preference in more than two
directions. Single-peakedness on a tree, introduced by Demange (1983) and studied further
by Danilov (1994),17 requires preferences to be monotonically non-increasing along such
17Savaglio and Vannucci (2014) extends the analysis to graphs that are not necessarily trees. We further
comment on this paper in Subsection 5.3. Schummer and Vohra (2002) also study a model where the set
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directions. Subsequent work by Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) shows that full single-
peakedness in this sense is not required for the design of strategy-proof, tops-only, anony-
mous and unanimous SCFs. They identify a weaker concept called semi-single-peakedness,
which is an implication of strategy-proofness and the other properties, and su¢ ces for the
design of such SCFs. The specication of semi-single-peakedness requires the selection of a
particular alternative on the tree, called the threshold, whose projection on each path on
the tree corresponds to a xed ballot on that path and the preference restriction of semi-
single-peakedness on each path coincides with the one depicted in Figure 2. We proceed by
rst summarizing their ndings and by showing that their formulation is a special case of
semilattice single-peakedness.
Assume that the set of alternatives A is a nite tree; i.e., for every pair of alternatives
(nodes) x; y 2 A, there is a unique path p linking them, denoted hx; yi. Two alternatives
x; y are directly linked if hx; yi = fx; yg:18 Given alternatives x; y; z 2 A, let (z; hx; yi)
denote the projection of z on the path hx; yi which is dened as the unique alternative
w 2 A such that hx; zi \ hy; zi = hw; zi. A path p is maximalif it cannot be extended by
adding more edges at either one of the two ends. Fix a particular alternative  on the tree
A (call it the threshold), and use it to specify a threshold on every maximal path p, denoted
(p), as (p) = (; p). Thus, for every maximal path p, if it contains the alternative ,
set (p) = ; otherwise, the threshold (p) is the unique alternative that lies on every path
from an alternative on the path p to alternative .19
Given A with a tree structure and the threshold  2 A; Chatterji, Sanver and Sen
(2013) say that a preference Ri is semi-single-peaked with respect to the threshold  if for
all x; y 2 A:
(i)

x; y 2 p such that x; y 2 ht(Ri); (p)i and x 2 ht(Ri); yi
) [xRiy], and
(ii)

x 2 p such that (p) 2 ht(Ri); xi
) [(p)Rix].
Moreover, they dene the two-agent SCF f , where for all x; y 2 A,
f(x; y) = (; hx; yi): (5)
They show that the SCF f dened by (5) is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and
of alternatives is possibly innite and arranged as a graph. They consider separately the case where the
graph is a tree and the case where the graph has cycles. They characterize strategy-proof and onto SCFs
assuming preferences are Euclidean, which satisfy our richness condition.
18See Example 3 in Subsection 5.3 for a description of how to, given a domain of preferences, directly
link two alternatives.
19The threshold seeks to identify an alternative on the path p that is closestto . In the absence of a
distance, the closest alternative is one that belongs to every path emanating from any alternative on p to
: On a tree, such an alternative is uniquely identied.
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unanimous on the domain of semi-single-peaked preferences on the tree A with respect to
the threshold .
The following facts can be veried.
(a) The binary relation  on A induced by f from (1) is such that for all x; y 2 A,
x  y if and only if x = (; hx; yi);
(b) The domain of all semi-single-peaked preferences with respect to  is rich on (A;),
so that (A;) is a semilattice and for all x; y 2 A; f(x; y) = sup(x; y): Figure 4 illustrates
this construction.
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Figure 4
(c) The set of strict semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A;) coincides with the
set of semi-single-peaked preferences with respect to the threshold :
4.3 Multidimensional models
In many social choice problems alternatives are multidimensional. To describe an alterna-
tive one has to specify the level reached in each of its attributes. Our setting includes also
these cases. Border and Jordan (1983) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993) are pro-
totypical examples of this approach, and they can be seen as extensions of Moulin (1980).
We rst relate our results with the main ones contained in these two papers and second,
with the results in Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) on voting by quota, the case
when each attribute can take only two possible values.
4.3.1 Multidimensional single-peaked preferences
We begin by postulating a multidimensional structure on the set of alternatives A, and
specifying a restricted domain. A preference with top x is multidimensional single-peaked
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on A if an alternative z that lies on the shortest path from x to y is weakly preferred to
y: General results in Border and Jordan (1983) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993)
imply that strategy-proof SCFs satisfying our properties are component-wise median voter
rules. We rst provide the details of this formulation and then identify it as an special
instance of semilattice single-peakedness.
Assume the set of alternatives A is a Cartesian product of subsets of real numbers; i.e.,
A =
KY
k=1
Ak;
where, for each k = 1; : : : ; K; Ak  R can be nite or innite.20 Dene the L1 norm in A
as follows: for every x 2 A,
kxk =
KX
k=1
jxkj:
Given x; y 2 A; let
MB(x; y) = fz 2 A j kx  yk = kx  zk+ kz   ykg
be the minimal box containing x and y:
A preference Ri 2 D is multidimensional single-peaked on A if, for all y 2MB(x; t(Ri));
yRix holds (namely, alternatives that lie on a L1 path going from x to t(Ri) should be
ranked at least as high as x):21 LetMSP be the set of all such preferences on A.
Let f :MSP2 ! A be an anonymous and unanimous SCF. Then, f is strategy-proof
if and only if there exists a vector of xed ballots  = (1; : : : ; K) 2 A such that for all
(R1; R2) 2MSP2 and k = 1; : : : ; K;
fk(R1; R2) = med>(tk(R1); tk(R2); k):
Consider a tops-only SCF f :MSP2 ! A and let  be the semilattice obtained from
f using (1). Furthermore, assume f is strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous, and let
 2 A be its associated vector of xed ballots. The following facts can be veried.
(a) For all x; y 2 A;
x  y if and only if x 2MB(y; ):
(b) The set of all multidimensional single-peaked preferences MSP is rich on (A;),
so that (A;) is a semilattice and for all x; y 2 A; f(x; y) = sup(x; y):
20Border and Jordan (1983) study the innite case while Barberà, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) study the
nite case.
21It is possible to show that the set of star-shaped and separable preferences on A (dened in Border
and Jordan (1983)) coincides with the set of multidimensional single-peaked preferences on A:
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(c) Let x 2 A: The preference Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A;) if and only if
for all y; z 2 A such that y 2MB(x; )\MB(x; z); yRxi z:We illustrate this fact in Figure
5 for the case K = 2 (see Appendix A.2 for a general proof of this statement). Observe
that y 2 MB(x; ); y 2 MB(x; z), y 2 MB(x;w); and sup(x; y) = yRxi z = sup(z; y)
and sup(x;w) = yR
x
iw = sup(w;w):
-
6
r
r r
r
r
x
yw
z
Figure 5
(d) As in the unidimensional case, the setMSP is the intersection of all sets of semilat-
tice single-peaked preferences, where each of these sets is associated to each of all possible
values  in A:
4.3.2 Voting by committees and separable preferences
Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) contains another example of a domain restriction,
where given a nite set of objects K = f1; : : : ; Kg agents have to choose a subset (possibly
empty) of K. It can be described as follows. The set of alternatives is the family 2K of all
subsets of K which can be identied with the K dimensional hypercube f0; 1gK : Namely,
any set X 2 2K can be described as the vector x 2 f0; 1gK where, for each k = 1; : : : ; K;
xk = 1 if and only if k 2 X: Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) identies the domain of
separable preferences and characterizes the class of strategy-proof SCFs with our properties
as voting by quota. Separable preferences allow agents to evaluate objects as goodor
bad. A voting by quota species an integer number for each object such that the object
is included in the chosen subset if and only if the number of agents who declared it as being
good is at least as large as this number. We proceed by specifying the details of this set up
and briey indicating the semilattice structure associated with it.
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A (strict) preference Ri on A is said to be separable if adding an object to a given set
makes the new set better if and only if the added object is good (as a singleton set, the
object is preferred to the empty set). In the hypercube representation of 2K; separability
of Ri implies the following feature. Let x be the vector of zeros and ones representing the
best subset of objects according to Ri; and take any pair of vectors y and z of zeros and
ones (i.e., two subsets of objects Y and Z). From z obtain x by iterating the following
procedure. Take a coordinate of z that does not coincide with the corresponding coordinate
of x; and replace it by the coordinate of x; obtaining z0: Proceed similarly from z0, until
x is reached. Then, yRiz if y is obtained in at least one of the steps of these procedures
starting at z to obtain x. Let S be the set of all separable preferences on f0; 1gK :
For simplicity we consider two agent SCFs. Following Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou
(1991) an SCF f : S2 ! f0; 1gK is voting by quota (not necessarily neutral) if there exists
q 2 f1; 2gK such that for all (R1; R2) 2 S2 and all k = 1; : : : ; K;
fk(R1; R2) = 1 if and only if #fi 2 N j tk(Ri) = 1g  qk: (6)
A characterization result in Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) implies that any
strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : S2 ! f0; 1gK is voting
by quota. We indicate now how this setting relates to our result.
Let f : S2 ! f0; 1gK be a voting by quota q: Let the binary relation  be induced from
f using (1). The set of all separable preferences is rich on (f0; 1gK ;) and is a subset of
semilattice single-peaked preferences on (f0; 1gK ;):
It turns out that the binary relation  has an interesting equivalent representation
(which we formally verify in Appendix A.3) that can be directly expressed using the quotas:
for all x; y 2 f0; 1gK ,
x  y if and only if x 2MB(; y);
where MB(; y) is as dened in Subsection 4.3.1 and the vector  2 f0; 1gK is as follows:
for every k = 1; : : : ; K, set
k =
(
1 if qk = 1
0 if qk = 2:
Moreover, it is easy to show that  = supf0; 1gK :
Finally, it is easy to see that the set of separable preferences is the intersection of all
semilattice single-peaked preferences as the quotas vary across all possible values.
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5 Final remarks
We nish the paper with some nal remarks related to issues left aside during the presen-
tation of the main results.
5.1 Our approach and our axioms
An important feature of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is that it puts no a priori
structure on the set of alternatives. The restricted domains literature typically proceeds
by restricting the formulation to nitely many alternatives with strict preferences or by
restricting attention to SCFs that satisfy continuity and are dened over continuous pref-
erences. We do not assume any structure of the set of alternatives. Our approach relies
on assuming a common domain of preferences for the agents. As shown by Le Breton and
Weymark (1999) (Proposition 1), under the assumption of a common domain of prefer-
ences, strategy-proof SCFs are such that each preference has a non-empty set of maximal
elements on the range of the SCF and furthermore, the SCFs satisfy an appropriate version
of unanimity.22 We specialize to the case where there is a unique maximal element for
each preference. This assumption excludes models where the set of alternatives has pri-
vate components since an agent would be indi¤erent among alternatives when the private
components of others change.23
Our approach relies on the tops-only property which allows us to associate to each
SCF the binary relation dened in (1). The anonymity of the SCF is another key axiom
that guarantees the antisymmetry of the binary relation while the richness assumption
guarantees that it is a partial order. Specically, our semilattice single-peakedness condition
requires that the supremum of a pair not be ranked higher than the supremum of a particular
pair, and thus admits indi¤erences since it is the negation of strict preferences. This
condition is predicated upon a partial order with the supremum property; the antisymmetry
of this partial order is indispensable to this condition. These features of our approach allow
us to sidestep the usual restrictions like niteness of the set of alternatives and the strictness
and/or continuity of preferences that were alluded to above.
We next discuss in greater detail the role of the tops-only axiom on the social choice
22These results do not assume any a priori structure on the set of alternatives. Their subsequent analysis
assumes continuity of preferences.
23See for instance Sprumont (1991) and Barberà, Berga and Moreno (2016). Moulin (1984) and Berga
(1998) indicate the di¢ culties of extending our results to a setting where agentspreferences may have
several tops, even in models with pure public goods. Extending our analysis to these cases is interesting
and left for future work.
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function. We begin with the tops-only property. The usual justication for this axiom is
that it a¤ords very signicant descriptive and computational advantages. This property
allows us to derive the binary relation on the set of alternatives from the social choice
function and thus is crucial to our analysis. What can be said if one drops this axiom?
We present an example that suggests that it would be di¢ cult to derive interesting domain
restrictions without the tops-only axiom. The example species a preference domain that
has no single-peaked type structure, but nonetheless admits a unanimous, anonymous and
strategy-proof SCF. This SCF is however not tops-only.
Example 1 Let A = fx; y; z; wg be the set of alternatives and D the domain of ve strict
preferences:
P x P y P z P
0z Pw
x y z z w
y x y w z
w w w x x
z z x y y
:
Consider the strategy-proof, non-tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : D2 ! A
dened by the following table:
f P x P y P z P
0z Pw
P x x y y w w
P y y y y w w
P z y y z z w
P
0z w w z z w
Pw w w w w w
:

One may wonder whether the fact that no structure is implied by the existence of
a unanimous, anonymous, strategy-proof SCF (as seen in Example 1) is driven by the
feature that the domain contains too fewpreferences. It might be possible to formulate
a concept of richness for non-tops-only SCFs and make some progress on this issue, but the
methodology would be very di¤erent and presumably much more complicated than the one
considered in this paper.
Another way to drop the tops-only axiom and still derive restrictions on domains would
be to strengthen the richness requirement so that the tops-only property follows as a con-
sequence of strategy-proofness and unanimity. There indeed are results on restricted do-
mains establishing that tops-onlyness is a requirement of strategy-proofness together with
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an additional property like unanimity, e¢ ciency or ontoness (see for instance Barberà, Son-
nenschein and Zhou (1991), Chatterji and Sen (2011), Sprumont (1995), Weymark (2008)).
But these approaches start from the very beginning with a given domain (often related to
single-peakedness) and a set of alternatives whose structure is explicitly used in obtaining
tops-onlyness as a requirement of strategy-proofness (and the additional property). We
face two di¢ culties in following this approach. The rst is that we do not impose any
structure on the domain of the SCF, except that it has to be rich and each preference
has a unique top, and no structure on the set of alternatives. It would be worthwhile to
identify conditions on domains at the level of generality of our model where unanimity and
strategy-proofness would ensure the tops-only property. These conditions can along with
our richness requirement be used to replicate our analysis without the tops-only axiom.
This task is outside the scope of the present study. Secondly, this approach implies that
every strategy-proof and unanimous SCF is tops-only. Our approach does not require the
domain to be such that every strategy-proof and unanimous SCF is tops-only; we merely
require that there is one with the tops-only property.
5.2 Example of a non-rich domain
Our methodology relies on establishing that a two agent strategy-proof, tops-only, anony-
mous and unanimous SCF f : D2 ! A induces a semilattice over A and that f takes the
supremum form, i.e., for every x; y 2 A; sup(x; y) exists and f(x; y) = sup(x; y):We show
here that the rich domain condition is indispensable for this property. It is well known that
for domains with few preferences it is possible to dene strategy-proof SCFs. The smaller
the domain is the larger the class of (often trivial) strategy-proof SCFs that might operate
on it. The literature contains several alternative concepts of rich domains. However, all of
them (as well as ours) are su¢ cient conditions which are far from being necessary. This
applies also to our setting: it is possible to nd a semilattice (A;); a non-rich and semi-
lattice single-peaked domain D on (A;) and a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and
unanimous SCF dened on it.
The example below exhibits a domain D, a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and
unanimous SCF f : D2 ! A whose induced partial order  over A is not a semilattice
because for some x; y 2 A; sup(x; y) does not exist (and hence f(x; y) 6= sup(x; y)), and
where D is not a rich domain on (A;):
Example 2 Let A = fx; y; z; z; wg be the set of alternatives and D the domain of ve
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strict preferences:
P x P y P z P z Pw
x y z z w
z z w w x
z z z z y
w w x y z
y x y x z
:
Consider the strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : D2 ! A dened
by the following table:
f x y z z w
x x z z z w
y z y z z w
z z z z w w
z z z w z w
w w w w w w
:
The partial order  induced by f can be represented by Figure 6:
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This partial order  is not a semilattice since sup(x; y) does not exist. But the domain
D is not rich on (A;) since z =2 [x; z] 6= ; and there does not exist any P^ x 2 D such that
xP^ xzP^ xz; observe that there are other missing preferences, for instance any P^ z such that
zP^ zxP^ zz. 
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5.3 Relation to other concepts of single-peakedness
Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b and 2010) start with an abstract algebraic structure
of a property space on a nite set of alternatives and a concept of betweenness, and
use it to dene the concept of generalized single-peakedness. The necessity part of their
characterization is similar to our analysis in spirit and shows that if there exists an onto,
strategy-proof, anonymous and neutral SCF on a rich domain of generalized single-peaked
preferences induced by a property space, then this property space is a median space.24 The
concepts of generalized single-peakedness and semilattice single-peakedness are related but
independent of each other. For instance, the complete domain, which never appears in our
analysis is a generalized single-peaked domain.
The domain of preferences we characterize is closer in spirit to semi-single-peaked do-
mains. Semilattice single-peakedness extends the concept of semi-single-peakedness in at
least three directions. The key di¤erences are that the set of alternatives may be innite
and preferences admit indi¤erences. The concept of semi-single-peakedness is built upon an
undirected graph which is necessarily a tree. The concept of semilattice single-peakedness
can be illustrated via a directed graph (which need not be a tree when viewed as an undi-
rected graph by ignoring the direction). Finally, the threshold (as described in Subsection
4.2) does not have to be an alternative; for instance, when A = (0; 1)  R and the partial
order  is the natural order > on real numbers (a semilattice on (0; 1)) then, 1 =2 A would
play the role of the threshold in Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013)s construction. We show
below that the analysis of Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) is not implied by our analysis
restricted to nitely many alternatives.
Example 3 Let A = fw; ; x; v; yg be the set of alternatives. We consider the following
domain D of exactly eight strict preferences given below:
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
w   x x v v y
 w x  v x y v
x x w w   x x
v v v v w w  
y y y y y y w w
:
This domain is strongly path connected in the terminology of Chatterji, Sanver and Sen
(2013) and consequently satises their richness condition. The concept of a strongly path
24See Bogomolnaia (1998) for representations of median voter schemes using medians on median graphs.
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connected domain can be seen as follows. The alternatives w and  are said to be strongly
connected since there exist two preference orderings P1 and P2 which rank the alternatives
x; v and y identically while the positions of w and , the top two ranked alternatives are
reversed across the two orderings. Likewise  and x; x and v, and nally v and y are
strongly connected. One now associates to this domain a graph whose vertices are the ve
alternatives and where two vertices are an edge if and only if they are strongly connected.
A domain is said to be strongly path connected if this graph is a connected graph. The
domain D specied above is indeed a strongly path connected domain. Figure 7 depicts
this strongly path connected graph.
r r r r rw  x v y
Figure 7
Now consider a median voter rule f : D2 ! A, where the xed ballot is located at 
and consider the partial order  associated with this SCF f as dened by (1). Namely,
  w and   x  v  y: Figure 8 depicts this semilattice.
r r r r r-   w  x v y
Figure 8
Observe that [y; x] is non-empty and w =2 [y; x]: This papers concept of richness requires
that there exist a preference ordering where x is the top ranked alternative and where
y is ranked above w: This condition is violated by P4 and P5 above. Thus the richness
condition of Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) does not imply that our richness condition will
necessarily be satised. The converse is also true since our concept of richness can be applied
to multidimensional models with multidimensional single-peaked (or separable) preferences
which are excluded by strongly path connected domains.25 Thus the two concepts of richness
and consequently the results of the two papers are independent. 
Savaglio and Vannucci (2014) consider a social choice setting where the set of alter-
natives is a distributive lattice (A;) from which a latticial ternary betweenness relation
is dened: z lies between x and y if and only if x ^ y  z  x _ y, where the binary
25Chatterji, Sen and Zeng (2016) characterize single-peaked preferences on a tree (as dened by Demange
(1983)) on strongly path connected domains using random social choice functions.
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operations ^ and _ are the inmum and the supremum taken according to , respectively.
Agentspreferences satisfy some unimodality conditions, that are consistent with this lat-
ticial ternary betweenness relation. They study and characterize strategy-proof SCFs on
such domains. Note that our setting admits semilattices that are not necessarily lattices
(the inmum of pairs of alternatives may not exist) and more importantly, we do not start
by assuming a specic structure on the set of alternatives but rather we obtain it as the
consequence of the existence of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF
on a rich domain of preferences.
Re¤gen (2015) considers the case where agentspreferences are single-peaked with re-
spect to di¤erent linear orders and characterizes strategy-proof SCFs. These typically
violate either anonymity or unanimity or both and hence, we cannot obtain his analysis
as a special case of our approach as we did in Section 4 for other formulations of single-
peakedness.
5.4 Characterization of all strategy-proof SCFs and group strategy-
proofness
Our results indicate that the supremum rule is prominent in the class of strategy-proof,
tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCFs. On an arbitrary (rich or otherwise) domain
of semilattice single-peaked preferences, the supremum rule is shown in Proposition 2 to
possess the aforementioned properties. On the other hand, any SCF with these proper-
ties, induces, under the hypothesis of richness, a two agent SCF that coincides with the
supremum rule. A complete characterization of all SCFs that are strategy-proof, tops-only,
anonymous and unanimous on an arbitrary domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences
is outside the scope of the present study.
There are semilattice single-peaked domains for which strategy-proof SCFs need not be
e¢ cient (see for instance voting by quota in Subsection 4.3.2) and hence these SCFs are
not group strategy-proof. In particular, a prole of semilattice single-peaked preferences
need not satisfy the indirect sequential inclusion condition of Barberà, Berga and Moreno
(2010) which guarantees that strategy-proof SCFs are group strategy-proof. One can expect
therefore that the domain implications of replacing strategy-proofness by group strategy-
proofness will be considerably more stringent. We leave the identication of such domains
for future work.
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Appendix
In this appendix we rst consider the case where the domain D is assumed to admit a
strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF g : Dn ! A where n is a positive
odd integer. We subsequently include proofs of assertions omitted in the text and end with
a remark on the case where the set of alternatives is nite.
A.1. The case of an odd number of agents
We illustrate using an example the sort of restrictions on the domain of preferences that
are implied by the existence of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF
with an odd number of agents.
Example 4 Assume the set of alternatives is the unit interval in the real line ordered
with the linear order >, i.e. A = [0; 1] and the SCF g : D3 ! A is a three agent SCF that
takes the form
g(P1; P2; P3) = medft(P1); t(P2); t(P3); 0; 1g; for all (P1; P2; P3) 2 D3;
that is, a median voter rule with two xed ballots located at the extremes. Trivially, g
is tops-only, anonymous and unanimous. Moreover, using Moulin (1980) and Berga and
Serizawa (2000) it can be easily veried that in this case, the strategy-proofness of g requires
thatD be single-peaked on [0; 1].26 In particular, any weaker restriction of semilattice single-
peakedness (as in Figure 2 in Subsection 3.2) will never su¢ ce for the strategy-proofness of
g. 
The example above assumed a special structure on the set of alternatives and a very
special form of the SCF. The domain implications for the general case of an arbitrary
g : Dn ! A where n is a positive odd integer is not attempted here. The purpose of the
example is to indicate that the domain implication arising from the hypothesis that there
exists an SCF with the required properties for an odd number of voters is likely to be
considerably more restrictive than semilattice single-peakedness. Proposition 2 illustrates
that semilattice single-peakedness su¢ ces for the design of a well-behaved SCF for all
numbers of voters; the additional restrictions (for instance of single-peakedness as in the
example above) implied by the hypothesis of the existence of a well-behaved SCF for an
odd number of voters are in a sense spurious. We devote the remainder of this section to
identifying a class of SCFs which are dened on an odd number of voters and where the
restriction on the domain implied by the axioms is exactly semilattice single-peakedness.
26See Subsection 3.2 for the formal denition of single-peakedness and the median.
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We will do so by introducing an additional axiom.27 This axiom requires that the SCF
satisfy an invariance requirement across two proles of preferences where agents tops are
either of two alternatives x or y; when the number of agents with top x and top y di¤er by
exactly one across the two proles.
Definition 3 The SCF g : Dn ! A, where n  3 is a positive odd integer, satises
invariance if for every x; y 2 A, for every i 2 N and every pair of preference proles
of the form (Ri; R i); (R0i; R i) 2 Dn where t(Ri) = x and t(R0i) = y, and R i is any
subprole where n 1
2
agents have x as their top and n 1
2
have y as their top, it is the case
that g(Ri; R i) = g(R0i; R i):
Let g : Dn ! A be a tops-only SCF, where n  3 is a positive odd integer. Dene the bi-
nary relation o induced by g over A as follows: for all (x; y) 2 AA, let (x; : : : ; x| {z }
n+1
2
; y; : : : ; y| {z }
n 1
2
)
denote a prole of top-ranked alternatives where the rst n+1
2
agents have x as the top and
the remaining n 1
2
agents have y as the top and dene
x o y if and only if g(x; : : : ; x| {z }
n+1
2
; y; : : : ; y| {z }
n 1
2
) = x: (7)
Remark 2 Let g : Dn ! A, where n  3 is positive odd integer, be a tops-only SCF and
o be the binary relation induced by g over A: If g is anonymous, and satises invariance,
then o is antisymmetric. If g is unanimous, then o is reexive.
Remark 3 The analogues of Lemmata 1 and 2 can be proved analogously for o as well
by standard arguments. We omit the details.
Finally we obtain as Proposition 4 the extension of Proposition 3 to the case where
n  3 is a positive odd integer and the SCF satises in addition invariance.
Proposition 4 Let g : Dn ! A be a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous
SCF that satises invariance where n  3 is a positive odd integer. Let o be the binary
relation induced by g over A and assume that D is rich on (A;o). Then, (i) o is a
semilattice over A, (ii) for all x; y 2 A, g(x; : : : ; x| {z }
n+1
2
; y; : : : ; y| {z }
n 1
2
) = supo(x; y); and (iii) D is
semilattice single-peaked on (A;o).
27We consider in A.1.1 a version of our analysis without this axiom.
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Remark 4 Part (iii) of the Proposition establishes that D is semilattice single-peaked on
(A;o). Consequently, by an application of Proposition 2 there exists a strategy-proof, tops-
only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : Dn ! A for all n. Furthermore, we note that
the SCF constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 also satises invariance.
Example 4 (continued) The median voter rule with two xed ballots located at the ex-
tremes considered in Example 4 yields the most restrictions on preferences in the class of all
median voter rules with 3 agents for the case where A is the unit interval ordered with >.
Indeed any median voter rule dened by positioning the two xed ballots at distinct alter-
natives other than 0 and 1; would impose less restriction on preferences, and would admit
domains of preferences that would only strictly contain the set of single-peaked preferences
on [0; 1]: The least restrictive case would arise when the two xed ballots are located on
the same alternative; the induced social choice function would then satisfy invariance and
the domain restriction implied would be exactly semilattice single-peakedness. 
We rst illustrate the content of the invariance axiom by exhibiting for well-known
settings SCFs that satisfy it and SCFs that do not.
Consider in the Moulin (1980) setting the SCF f : SP3 ! [0; 1] that for all (x; y; z) 2
[0; 1]3; f(x; y; z) = med>fx; y; z; 1; 2g; where 1; 2 2 [0; 1]: Then, f satises invariance
if and only if 1 = 2:
Consider the Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) setting with n = 3 and K = 2:
The SCF f : S3 ! f0; 1g2 dened by quota q = (q1; q2) satises invariance if and only if
q1 6= 2 and q2 6= 2.
Clearly, in the Moulin (1980) and in the Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) settings
there are many instances of well studied SCFs that satisfy all our requirements but violate
invariance. But in both cases, there indeed exist some SCFs which satisfy invariance in
addition to the properties we have imposed in this paper.28 In what follows, we provide a
brief account of the picture without assuming invariance.
A.1.1. Odd number of agents without invariance
We continue the analysis of an odd number of agents by not imposing invariance of the
SCF. At the end of this subsection we introduce invariance in order to understand its role
in Proposition 4.
28However, the example in Appendix A in Nehring and Puppe (2010) exhibits a domain that admits a
unique strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF for an odd number of agents that does
not satisfy invariance.
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We restrict attention to the case n = 3: By the cloning method employed in Fact 1, we
can induce such an SCF whenever one exists for an odd number of agents that is divisible by
3. Let f : D3 ! A be strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF. Fix x 2 A
and dene, following a procedure also introduced by Bogomolnaia (1998), gx : D2 ! A by
setting, for each pair y; z 2 A; gx(y; z) = f(x; y; z): Then gx is a strategy-proof, tops-only
and anonymous SCF. Note that we cannot deduce that gx is unanimous since gx(y; y) = y
does not follow from the assumed unanimity of f: Let x be the binary relation induced
by gx over A using (1). Remark 1 applies and the binary relation x is antisymmetric but
cannot be assumed reexive since gx(y; y) = y is not guaranteed.
We will therefore consider binary relations that are antisymmetric and transitive (which
will follow from the richness axiom we introduce below) and refer to them as orders. The
following denitions generalize our concepts of richness and semilattice single-peakedness
to the case at hand.
Definition 4 Let A be an arbitrary set. A family of orders frgr2A over A is given. The
domain D is rich on (A; frgr2A) if for any y; z; w 2 A, if [y; z]x is non-empty for some
x 2 A and w =2 [y; z]x, then there exist Ryi ; Rzi 2 D such that zP yi w and yP zi w:
Definition 5 Let frgr2A be a family of orders over A: The domain D is order-family
single-peaked on (A; frgr2A) if for all x; y; z; w 2 A and all Rxi ; Rzi 2 D;
(i) supw(x; y)R
x
i supw(z; y) and
(ii) supz(x; y)R
z
i supw(x; y).
To see why conditions (i) and (ii) in Denition 5 follow from strategy-proofness, consider
x; y; z; w 2 A and anyRx2 ; Rz1 2 D: Then (i) follows from supw(x; y) = f(w; x; y)Rx2f(w; z; y) =
supw(z; y) and (ii) follows from supz(x; y) = f(z; x; y)R
z
1 supw(x; y) = f(w; x; y).
The proofs of Lemmata 1 and 2 do not require that the two-agent SCF under considera-
tion satises unanimity. These Lemmata apply here if the domain D is rich on (A; frgr2A)
(in the sense of Denition 4). We omit the details. Consequently, analogously to Propo-
sition 3, we obtain here for all x; y; z 2 A, gx(y; z) = supx(y; z) and D is order-family
single-peaked on (A; frgr2A).
To summarize, if a domain D admits a three agent SCF satisfying strategy-proofness,
tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity and the richness condition is satised, then D
is order-family single-peaked on (A; frgr2A). However, we have been unable to evaluate
whether this concept of single-peakedness would su¢ ce for the design of a strategy-proof
SCF satisfying tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity. This is the principal di¢ culty in
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extending our analysis for an even number of agents in Section 2 to the case of an odd
number of agents.
We are however able to design an SCF with the required four properties if we introduce
additionally a concept of invariance of the family of orders. We express invariance in terms
of the family of orders as follows. We say that the family of orders frgr2A satises order-
invariance if supx(x; y) = supy(x; y) for all pairs (x; y): This condition would be implied
by the existence of an SCF dened for an odd number of agents that satises strategy-
proofness, tops-onlyness, anonymity, unanimity and invariance in the sense of Denition
3.
We may now dene a two agent SCF in the following manner; for any pair (x; x) of alter-
natives, dene f(x; x) = x; while for any pair (x; y); x 6= y; of alternatives, dene f(x; y) =
supx(x; y) = supy(x; y): It is evident that this SCF satises anonymity, unanimity and is
tops-only. This SCF will also satisfy strategy-proofness whenever D is order-family single-
peaked on (A; frgr2A). Indeed we have f(x; y) = supy(x; y)Rxi supy(z; y) = f(z; y) by
(i) of Denition 5. This verication of strategy-proofness uses the invariance of the family
of orders in a central way and breaks down without it.
A.2. Multidimensional semilattice single-peakedness
We now prove that in the multidimensional model the following characterization of
semilattice single-peaked preferences holds:
The preference Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A;) if and only if for all y; z 2 A
such that y 2MB(x; ) \MB(x; z); yRxi z.
First, we show that if Rxi is semilattice single-peaked on (A;), then for all y; z 2 A
such that y 2 MB(x; ) \ MB(x; z); yRxi z. Since y 2 MB(x; ); it is true that y  x
and hence, sup(x; y) = y. Moreover, y 2 MB(x; z), implies that, for each k = 1; : : : ; K;
either xk  yk  zk or zk  yk  xk: Before proceeding, we identify from (A;) a family
of semilattices (Ak;k); one for each component k; which correspond to the semilattice of
the one-dimensional case. For each k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg the pair (Ak;k) is a semilattice where
k is dened as follows: for xk; yk 2 Ak;
xk k yk if and only if either yk  xk  k or k  xk  yk:
Assume without loss of generality that xk  yk  zk: Since xk  yk  k; supk(xk; zk) =
supk(yk; zk) = k if k  zk and supk(xk; zk) = supk(yk; zk) = zk otherwise. Hence,
sup(x; z) = sup(y; z): By semilattice single-peakedness, we know that sup(x; z)R
x
i sup(z; z).
Thus, sup(y; z)R
x
i z. Since sup(x; y)R
x
i sup(z; y) by semilattice single-peakedness, we
have yRxi z as required.
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Conversely, we show that if for all y; z 2 A such that y 2 MB(x; a) \ MB(x; z),
yRxi z, then R
x
i is semilattice single-peaked on (A;). Given y; z 2 A, to show that
sup(x; y)R
x
i sup(z; y), it su¢ ces to show that sup(x; y) 2MB(x; )\MB(x; sup(z; y)):
Since sup(x; y)  x, it is evident that sup(x; y) 2 MB(x; ). Next, to show that
sup(x; y) 2 MB(x; sup(z; y)), we simplify the notation and let sup(x; y) = w and
sup(z; y) = w
0. We know that for each k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, wk = med>(xk; yk; k) and
w0k = med>(zk; yk; k). Assume without loss of generality that xk  yk. Consider three sit-
uations: (i) wk = xk, (ii) wk = k and (iii) wk = yk. In situation (i), it is evident that either
xk  wk  w0k or w0k  wk  xk: In situation (ii), we know that xk  k  yk. Consequently,
w0k = med>(xk; yk; k)  k = wk. Hence, xk  wk  w0k. In situation (iii), we know that
k  yk. Consequently, w0k = med>(xk; yk; k)  yk = wk. Hence, xk  wk  w0k. In
conclusion, wk is always in the middle of xk and w0k for all k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg. Therefore,
sup(x; y) 2MB(x; sup(z; y)) as required.
A.3. The binary relation  in voting by quota
We show that in the voting by quota model, the binary relation ; obtained by setting
for all x; y 2 f0; 1gK ,
x  y if and only if x 2MB(; y);
is induced by f over A by condition (1).
Assume x  y:We want to show that f(x; y) = x; i.e.; fk(x; y) = xk for all k = 1; : : : ; K:
Take an arbitrary k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg and assume rst that fk(x; y) = 1: Since f is voting by
quota, xk + yk 6= 0: If xk + yk = 2 then, xk = 1 and fk(x; y) = xk: Assume now that
xk + yk = 1: Since f is voting by quota, qk = 1; and by the denition of ; k = 1: To
obtain a contradiction, suppose xk = 0: Since, by the denition of ; x 2MB(; y) holds,
we have that yk = 0; a contradiction with the assumption that xk + yk = 1: Assume now
that fk(x; y) = 0: Then, xk+yk < qk: If xk = 0 then fk(x; y) = xk; which is what we wanted
to prove. If xk = 1 then qk = 2; k = 0 and yk = 0: Hence, x =2 MB(; y): Thus, x  y; a
contradiction. Since k was arbitrary, f(x; y) = x:
To prove the other implication in the denition of x  y by (1) assume f(x; y) = x:
We want to show that x  y: Take an arbitrary k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg. Suppose rst that xk = 0:
If yk = 1 then qk = 2 and k = 0: Namely, (i) xk = k = 0 and yk = 1: If yk = 0 then
either qk = 1; in which case k = 1; or qk = 2; in which case k = 0: Namely, either (ii)
xk = yk = 0 and k = 1 or (iii) xk = yk = k = 0. Suppose now that xk = 1: If yk = 1
then either qk = 1, in which case k = 1, or qk = 2, in which case k = 0: Namely, either
(iv) xk = yk = k = 1 or (v) xk = yk = 1 and k = 0. If yk = 0 then qk = 1, in which
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case k = 1: Namely, (vi) xk = k = 1 and yk = 0: Hence, (i) to (vi) hold for an arbitrary
k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg: Thus, x 2MB(; y); and by denition of ; x  y holds.
A.4. Finite set of alternatives
We identify in the Corollary below a set of necessary conditions on any strategy-proof,
tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF which applies to the case where the set of
alternatives is nite and n is an even positive integer. This is obtained by combining
Proposition 3 with a result on two agent SCFs from Bogomolnaia (1998).
Corollary 1 Let (D; A;) be such that D is rich on (A;) and A is nite. If there
exists a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF g : Dn ! A; where n  2
is an even positive integer, that induces  over A, then (i) A  f0; 1gK for some positive
integer K, (ii) there exists  2 A such that fk(xk; yk) = med>(xk; yk; k) for k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg
and x; y 2 A, where the SCF f : D2 ! A is induced by g; (iii) D is semilattice single-peaked
on (A;), or equivalently, for all x; y; z 2 A; [y 2MB(x; ) \MB(x; z)]) [yRxi z]:
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